

# **National Lead Force Performance Report**

Q3: October – December 2023



The dashboard provides an assessment of City of London Police (CoLP) performance against the National Lead Force (NLF) aims and objectives as set out in the National Lead Force Plan 2020-2023 (NLF Plan). The NLF Plan was approved by the City of London Police Authority in October 2020. The Plan sets out how CoLP will improve the national response to fraud. It reflects NLF's contribution and commitment to the National Fraud Policing Strategy and the National Economic Crime Centre's (NECC) five-year strategy. The NECC leads the 'whole system' effort to drive down growth in fraud on behalf of the UK Government.

	,		Data T	rends	
The NLF pla	an sets out five outco	mes that City of London Police is seeking to achieve: -	Q2	Q3	
Outcome 1	Supporting and safeguarding victims	We provide a service for victims that is accessible, user-friendly and easy to engage with, and we successfully support and safeguard victims.	to 🔶		
Outcome 2	Disrupt fraudsters	We disrupt fraudsters that operate domestically and from overseas in order to make it harder for them to commit crime here in the UK.	+	-	
Outcome 3	Investigate and prosecute	We successfully lead the local to national policing response in investigating and prosecuting fraudsters, ensuring better outcomes for victims.	+		
Outcome 4	Raise awareness and prevent crime				
Outcome 5	Building capabilities				
	LONDON LICE The	grading criteria can be found in Appendix A – Performance Assessment Criteria			

## **Executive Summary**

	Outcome 1		Outcome 2		Outcome 3		Outcome 4		Outcome 5	
Supporting and safeguarding victims		Disrupt fraudsters		Investigate and prosecute		Raise awareness and prevent crime		Building capabilities		
А. В.	was consistent.	Α.	The number of disruptions against OCGs was above the 22/23 average.	Α.	The number of judicial outcomes that were recorded nationally was	Α.	The number of social media posts was lower than Q2, but higher	Α.	ECCA training levels increased both across number of courses and	
C.	Higher levels of NECVCU repeat victims in Q3.	В.	Total disruptions against OCGs and SOC strategic		down slightly from Q2 and the 22/23 average.		than any quarter in 22/23 with a range of	_	number of delegates trained.	
D.	Victim survey results from Q3 show 82% confidence, a slight increase from Q2.		vulnerabilities surpassed both Q2 and the 22/23 quarterly average.	В.	CoLP outcomes remained stable but were still below the 22/23 average.	В.	messaging across all teams. The related impressions	В.	ECCA satisfaction rose following a dip in October.	
E. F.	Level 2 service increased. 100% Vulnerable Person Alerts sent in 7 days.	В.	Proportionally, Q2 saw a slight drop in the number of Major and Moderate	C.	All 45 forces remained compliant in reporting their outcomes.	C.	rose compared to Q2. Action Fraud carried out a successful Christmas	C.	NLF demonstrated a range of collaborations in Q3. An international	
G.	49% of highly - likely reports reviewed in 28 days, with disseminations increasing.	C.	disruptions to OCGs. The number of POCA activities decreased from	D.	LFOR reported good performance consistently across the range of their		campaign targeting a range of fraud types over 12 days. IFED led a		project led by the Intelligence Development Team is	
Н. I.			Q2 but the value from them rose.		activities, which includes supporting international		2-week intensification period that targeted	D.	highlighted. PECT teams staffing	
J.	by the target 7 days. 86% of live cyber incidents responded to in 2 hours.	D.	Disruptions against cyber enablers fell from Q2 which saw over 9,000 in		and national campaigns – in this period Operation Emma 9.		commercial motor insurance fraud, with positive results.		moved closer to the end of year target, and teams demonstrated	
К. L.	83% Protect advice sent in 72 hrs Number of Recall alerts sent down 21% from Q2.		one month. The other platforms saw improved performance.						positive results in the period.	




The grading criteria can be found in Appendix A – Performance Assessment Criteria




**NLF Role:** We provide a service for victims that is accessible, user-friendly and easy to engage with, and we successfully support and safeguard victims.

#### **Success Measures:**

- A. To provide a consistent level of satisfaction with the Action Fraud telephone reporting service.
- B. To provide a consistent level of satisfaction with the Action Fraud online reporting service.





**Telephone Reporting Service** - The Action Fraud confirmation survey looks at victim satisfaction with the service provided, call handler knowledge, and average call waiting time. Feedback to this survey in Q3 indicates that satisfaction remains stable and within target at 96%. Overall satisfaction levels in this area remain high over the long term.

In 2023 a recruitment drive, ongoing bi-weekly classes and enhancements to the Advisor XP Contact Centre tool led to an improvement in recording accuracy and the quality of advice and referrals provided to victims. This continues to positively impact victim satisfaction. Enhanced processes saw call handling times increase by 2% in Q3 with an average handle time of 22.6 mins up from 22 in Q2.

Average call waiting times increased from Q2 by 7% to 6.64 minutes but represented a reduction of 49% on Q3 2022/23. December recorded the 5<sup>th</sup> lowest call wait time to date and call wait time satisfaction remained stable and within target at 89% across Q2 and Q3, up from 80% in Q3 of 2022/23.

In December, the Mon-Fri, 8am-8pm service recorded an abandonment rate of 16.81%. This is the 7<sup>th</sup> consecutive month that abandonment has been under 30% and represents the best performance of 2023.

To provide a consistent level of satisfaction with the telephone reporting service, Action Fraud provide facilities to enhance accessibility into the service, such as Language Line and Sign Video reporting for the hearing impaired. Victim feedback satisfaction survey - Over 2m links have been delivered since the October 2018 launch with over 22.5k respondents (1.1%) opting to provide satisfaction feedback or free text responses which are reviewed to continuously improve the service.

Feedback indicates that Action Fraud advisors provide a consistently good service. Overall, 1.4% of those reporting a crime in Q3 opted to provide satisfaction feedback.

**Online Reporting Service** satisfaction was within target in Q3 at 86%, rising from 83% in Q2 and with an October peak of 88%.

Action Fraud are unable to amend the current web reporting tool. A new reporting tool is in development and set to launch in 2024. It is anticipated this will align online and telephone satisfaction. In the short term, facilities such as webchat and a chat bot have improved satisfaction through the provision of support and guidance, assisting victims through the self-reporting process. This increases advisor capacity to answer more calls and dedicate more time to support vulnerable callers.

**NLF Role:** We provide a service for victims that is accessible, user-friendly and easy to engage with, and we successfully support and safeguard victims.


#### **Success Measures:**

- C. To reduce the level of repeat victimisation after NECVCU contact.
- D. To ensure victims feel safer and more confident after NECVCU contact, with reduced emotional harm and improved sense of safety.
- E. To improve consistency of victim support across all police forces.

The National Economic Crime Victim Care Unit (NECVCU) supports forces at a local level, delivering care to victims of fraud and cyber-crime, allowing for a consistent and national standard of care and support.

The **Level 1** service gives Protect/Prevent advice to non-vulnerable victims of fraud. The **Level 2** service engages with victims when vulnerability is identified, and by giving crime prevention advice and signposting to local support services helps the victim to cope and recover from the fraud.


The **Level 3** service is escalation to the local police service due to immediate risk of harm.



**Repeat Victims** – The definition of a repeat victim is "a second or subsequent report by a victim of fraud who has had previous contact with NECVCU within a rolling 12-month period". During the period there were 18 repeat victims identified, down from the 2022/23 quarterly average of 26 but up from 6 in Q2. In Q3 both services engaged with a total of 13,839 victims, meaning the 18 repeat victims represent 0.14% of victim contacts.

Victims feel safer – A victim survey has been launched, measuring whether victims feel safer and more confident after contact with an Advocate. Early results from Q3 show 82% are more confident and 75% feel safer. Response levels to the survey have been low but are expected to rise as the process is embedded.

**Consistent Support** – The NECVCU now supports **43** forces in England and Wales at level 1 and following a significant staff uplift in May, provides **37** forces with an additional service at level 2 (formerly 6 forces and increasing by 1 in December 2023), with talks to onboard more in the future. Escalations to provide additional service(s) to support vulnerable victims following interaction with NECVCU have risen from 286 in Q2 to 416 in Q3. This is likely the result of more police forces being supported from different points during the period.






**NLF Role:** We provide a service for victims that is accessible, user-friendly and easy to engage with, and we successfully support and safeguard victims.

### **Success Measures:**

- F. To review and, where appropriate, disseminate vulnerable person alert within 7 days.
- G. To review and respond to all allegations of fraud that meet 'highly likely' or 'likely vulnerable' on the solvability matrix, within 28 days.
- H. To provide an NFIB outcome to all victims, within 28 days.


**Vulnerable Person Alerts** – To identify potentially vulnerable victims, searches are run on all reports of fraud, looking for under 18s, and agreed 'risky words' which highlight a vulnerability risk for the victim – such as suicide, mental health, or threats to life.

In Q3, the search found 8,357 reports came from vulnerable victims and 100% were reviewed and disseminated for safeguarding (2,582) or PROTECT activity (5,769) within the target of 72 hours, demonstrating the priority placed on victim care.



**Priority Allegations** – The process for prioritising which reports to review was developed in 2022. Rather than monetary thresholds, fraud reports are now assessed against a number of criteria to establish a 'solvability' score. Those 'highly likely' and 'likely' to be solved are prioritised for review.

During Q3, 49% (up 30%) of 'highly likely' and 13% of 'likely vulnerable' reports were reviewed within 28 days of reporting. The overall volume of disseminations for the year peaked in October at 11,147.



### Victim Contact regarding Outcomes

100% of fulfilment letters were dispatched to victims within 48 hours of the request being received.

The NFIB has multiple advice letters, tailored to each fraud type, which are emailed to victims on a weekly basis. This service is known as 'Send in Blue'. In August 2021, this process was automated, and the success rate went from a low of 59% in June to an average of 99.69% for the rest of 2021/22. In Q3 23/24, the success rate of Send in Blue was also 100%.

This financial year NFIB has introduced an information letter to victims where a disruption has taken place. This additional contact has reduced complaints regarding lack of police action.



### A local service with a national role, trusted by our communities to deliver policing with professionalism, integrity and compassion

### **Outcome 1:** Supporting and Safeguarding Victims.

**NLF Role:** We provide a service for victims that is accessible, user-friendly and easy to engage with, and we successfully support and safeguard victims.

#### **Success Measures:**

- I. To review and disseminate all Action Fraud reports classified with an NFIB Cybercrime code, within 7 days of report creation.
- J. To respond to all live cybercrime reports, within 2 hours of reporting.
- K. All businesses reporting cyber enabled crime to receive Protect advice within 72 hours of receipt by the Protect Team.



175

50

25

100


75

50

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
Organisations receiving advice

Percentage in 72 hrs of reporting



**Live Cyber Incidents** – 42 live cyber incidents were recorded in Q3. Each one was reviewed, and a response was sent within 2 hours in 86% of the incidents.

This is due to a minority of disseminations being delayed by issues such as technical problems or review by the NCA. The majority of reports are reviewed and disseminated in less than 60 minutes.



**Protect Advice** – NFIB Business Protect provided protect advice to 344 organisations during Q3, down 17% (-69) from the previous quarter, due to fewer reports received over the festive season.

83% (297) of organisations received the advice within 72 hours of reporting to Action Fraud. This measure is expected to recover from seasonal delays during the next reporting period.



**Cyber Reports** – In Q3, 11,097 reports were classified with a Cybercrime code, up 3.5% (+380) from the previous quarter and up 97% (+5,462) from Q3 22/34.

Of these reports, 100% were disseminated for Protect or Pursue activity, 98% within the target 7-day period. Performance peaked at 99% in October.





Protect advice within 72 hours

20%

0%


**NLF Role:** We provide a service for victims that is accessible, user-friendly and easy to engage with, and we successfully support and safeguard victims.

#### **Success Measures:**

L. To help victims of fraud to prevent or recover losses through information sharing with the banking sector and support from victim care.

The **NLF Victim Care Unit** is a unique team, which acts as a conduit between NLF Fraud Ops Investigations and their victims of fraud. NLF VCU ensure that the Victims Code Of Practice is complied with and address the welfare needs of victims by triaging out to support services. They also play a part in the Protect strand of the 4P plan by proactively offering prevention advice to stop revictimization, also disrupting OCG activity.


NLF VCU have an ongoing partnership with TrueCall who install call blocking devices for victims who receive high volumes of fraudulent calls. Volumes were steady from Q1 to Q3 but remained below the 22/23 average due to devices no longer being used. The team will attempt to issue further units during the quarter.




**Project RECALL** is an initiative for informing banks about fraudulent payments so they may consider acting against beneficiary accounts and repatriate victims' money. This quarter 2,375 account alerts were sent to banks, down 21% from Q2 (-624). The value of Q3 alerts also fell from £10,801,427 to £9,538,812 (-12%). Volumes of alerts have fallen since their peak in August 2023, but remain above the 22/23 benchmark. Recall has noted a fall in manually processed alerts from foreign law enforcement. which typically contain high loss payment diversion frauds. This is a likely reason for lower recorded losses in Q3.

In Q2 NFIB analysed data, held meetings with participating banks and reviewed processes with UK Finance. This work helped to identify best practices within banks and create recommendations to improve the process. New relationships with additional financial institutions were established so that more alerts can be sent and acted upon.

The number of disrupted bank accounts has risen since the inception of the project. The initiative allows for funds to be returned to victims and disrupts fraudsters, demonstrates good partnership working, and provides CoLP with the ability to start an investigation if an alert is missed by a bank.










**NLF Role:** We disrupt fraudsters that operate domestically and from overseas in order to make it harder for them to commit crime here in the UK.

### **Success Measures:**

- A. To sustain the level of National Lead Force disruptions against Organised Crime Groups and Strategic Vulnerabilities.
- B. To increase the proportion of Major and Moderate disruptions.







There are currently 69 mapped **Organised Crime Groups (OCGs)** under investigation by National Lead Force teams. There were **21 disruptions** claimed against NLF OCGs in Q3, which is the same as in Q2 and is just above the quarterly average of 19 from 2022/23. A Major disruption represents the OCG being fully dismantled or impacted at a key player level. There have been 4 major disruptions for Q3, and 9 moderates. There were an additional 284 disruptions against Serious Organised Crime strategic vulnerabilities throughout the period.

Activity against OCGs is not consistent and depends on a number of factors, including resources, capacity, and criminal activity. It is worth noting that approximately 35 of the active operations are Tier 4 investigations, meaning they are **awaiting court results** and/or are in their final stages before being archived. This means no further operational activity is planned against them and the only disruption left to claim is a Major once sentences are delivered. There have been many adjourned NLF cases in the last year, mostly due to Covid backlogs and barrister strikes.

### **Notable Major Disruptions**

**IFED** secured convictions for 4 nominals who submitted a series of false property claims. They have received suspended sentences totalling 44 months, compensation of over £9,000, 180 hours unpaid work, and £2,050 court costs were ordered. In another case a 28-month custodial sentence for fraud by abuse of position and computer misuse was given after an RSA employee used his position to steal customer data and sell it to claims management companies. This was a complex data theft case and IFED are working with RSA on a joint briefing to upskill the insurance industry and help protect customer data.


In December **PIPCU** seized approximately 4,000 counterfeit items worth an estimated £1 million during raids on Camden High Street, North London. In one shop, officers seized counterfeit football shirts worth an estimated loss to the industry of £69,800. Counterfeit designer bracelets, thought to be worth an estimated loss of around £400,000, and £19,240 worth of counterfeit trainers were found in another shop. The operation was supported by the Intellectual Property Office (IPO), Camden Council's Trading Standards, the Anti-Counterfeiting Group and Lighthouse Security.




**NLF Role:** We disrupt fraudsters that operate domestically and from overseas in order to make it harder for them to commit crime here in the UK.

### **Success Measures:**

C. To increase the use of POCA powers to freeze, restrain and protect proceeds of crime.







### **Notable POCA Activities**


**DCPCU** investigated an offence of mandate fraud resulting in a loss of over £870k. Investigators identified that a London hotel had been impersonated to gain access to accounts. Though passive data, communications data, intelligence and money laundering enquiries DCPCU identified a suspect in the fraud who has been arrested, charged and remanded in custody where they currently await trial. Through financial investigation DCPCU have been able to recover over £750k of fraud losses to date.

An intelligence led operation by DCPCU focused on the purchase of compromised card data from dark market websites by a prolific criminal. Officers obtained warrants to search the premises occupied and controlled by the suspect. The warrants were executed, during which over £150k in cash, cards in other people's names, and drugs were found and seized. Two suspects were arrested in connection with fraud and possession with intent to supply drugs. The suspects were released whilst the investigation continues.

Following an investigation by DCPCU into a multi-handed £10m diversion/mandate fraud case, one of the nominals received an 11-year sentence. In 2022 they were ordered to pay a £500k confiscation order based on a house Nigeria. He has failed to pay the order, trying to sell the house below market value. The CPS POCA enforcement lawyer applied for a restraint order of £750k to prevent the house being sold without prior approval and consent.

#### **Use of POCA Powers**


In Q3, Operational Fraud teams and Funded Units carried out 13 POCA activities. This is below the 2022/23 quarterly average of 15 and the Q2 total of 16. Most of the activity focused on asset restraining orders (7). The greatest value came in November, driven by an asset restraining order by DCPCU totalling £750,000. Additionally, the teams worked to ensure that Courts awarded 3 victims £15,000 compensation.





**NLF Role:** We disrupt fraudsters that operate domestically and from overseas in order to make it harder for them to commit crime here in the UK.

### **Success Measures:**

D. To increase the identification and disruption of cyber enablers to curtail criminality and protect victims.







In Q3, **NFIB's Prevention and Disruption team** (P&D) had success in disrupting websites engaging in investment fraud. The team conducted a weeklong pro-active operation disrupting fraudulent High Yield Investment Program websites which resulted in 173 suspension requests. These included sites offering crypto investment, forex trading and other regulated investment types.


The P&D team monitored and reviewed new websites being registered with Nominet which featured words relating to banking and found a significant number of attempts by suspects. Nominet confirmed that they suspended 90 websites referred to them by the team in the period. Nominet also confirmed that they suspended 35 new websites believed to be impersonating the FCA/FSCS after referrals from P&D.

Toward the end of the quarter, the P&D team also commenced use of the new META portal, allowing them to seek suspension of META accounts engaging in fraudulent activity. It also has the facility to seek hacked Facebook and Instagram accounts and the team have successfully repatriated a number of accounts to their rightful owners, preventing the victims from losing valuable photos, memories and contacts.

PIPCU participated in the latest wave of Operation 404, led by @UKinBrazil to take down illegal streaming services in Brazil, Peru, the US and the UK. It resulted in 606 websites being removed, including 40 in the UK. During Q3, a total of 4,376 disruptions to technological enablers were recorded, lower than the previous two quarters. Although the volume of disruptions to websites continued to rise month on month and social media, email and phone disruptions rose, opportunities for large volumes of disruptions to bank accounts did not present themselves.

Volumes of disruptions fluctuate throughout the year according to operational priorities, opportunities and intensifications.

During the quarter, P&D prevented approximately £2,755,000 of potential loss to victims through their disruption activities.




### **Outcome 3:** Investigate and Prosecute.

**NLF Role:** We successfully lead the local to national policing response in investigating and prosecuting fraudsters, ensuring better criminal justice outcomes for victims.

### **Success Measures:**

- A. To increase the number of judicial outcomes recorded nationally by Policing.
- B. To increase the number of judicial outcomes recorded by City of London Police.
- C. To maintain the level of Home Office forces in the compliant category for reporting at 100%.



The total outcomes reported in a period can relate to disseminations from any time frame. The volume of outcomes is expected to fluctuate throughout the year as cases with varying numbers of crimes attached are seen in courts. For example, one investigation into a boiler room might have hundreds of outcomes attached to it and closing the case will give many outcomes, potentially bringing closure to multiple victims.

Note: Judicial outcomes refer to Home Office Counting Rules Outcomes 1-8 which include charges, cautions, taken into consideration etc. (they do not refer to the wider criminal justice process).

FY 23/24 FYTD	No. Forces
Compliant (7-9 Returns)	45
Partially Compliant (3-6 Returns)	0
Non Compliant (0-2 Returns)	0

Forces are required to provide outcome information to CoLP every month, matched against their NFIB disseminations. In Q3, all forces provided their return each month. The National Coordinators Office (NCO) continue to engage with forces to ensure compliance is maintained. In Q3 2023/24 the **national** yield of judicial outcomes dropped to 1,196, down 26% (-429) on the previous year's Q3 (1,625). Year to date, a poor Q3 means that nationally we produced 4,372 judicial outcomes, however this is only 7% or 379 outcomes below the 4,751 YTD recorded for the prior year period (2022/23).

The poor Q3 period is due to only one force yielding above 50 outcomes in any of the 3 months (53); in comparison two forces yielded 100+ in a month, in both Q1 and Q2. Many of these were historic outcomes to large cases with circa 54 and 113 respectively. The NCO has begun to work with forces on their outstanding investigations, to close the year in a strong position.

**CoLP** Judicial outcomes are down from Q2 to Q3 by 3 (-8%), up by 8 (+32%) from Q3 22/23 and in line with the Q2-Q4 2022/23 average of 33. In Q1 last year the Fraud teams undertook a sweeping exercise of old Judicial outcomes, finalising 186 in total through this process. When comparing the first 9 month's performance and excluding this 186, CoLP achieved 110 judicial outcomes in the period last year, 21 more than 23/24 to date.



### **Outcome 3:** Investigate and Prosecute.

**NLF Role:** We successfully lead the local to national policing response in investigating and prosecuting fraudsters, ensuring better criminal justice outcomes for victims.

### **Success Measures:**

D. Through leadership of LFOR improve the coordination of Operational Activity across Policing to increase Pursue outcomes for victims.


### National and International Coordination and Assistance

LFOR assisted other Forces and Regions with 11 **requests for assistance** during Q3 2023/24. The requests were for arrests and premises searches. This is a key role of LFOR who provide Operational and Investigative support to all UK Forces and Regions to progress cases with enquiries in London.

A high number of **OCG** activities that impact victims across the country have links to London, and by providing such support LFOR are supporting partners in expediting positive outcomes and disruption opportunities.

LFOR received and developed **5 cases** that were subject of **Case Acceptance Plans** for consideration by NLF Operations. This compares to 10 cases the previous quarter.

There have also been **41** International requests for assistance from Foreign Law Enforcement Agencies. These are managed within LFOR, and during this quarter the highest number of requests were from Portugal. The average time for completion for Q3 was 33 days which is well within the 90-day target.





Operation Emma 9 was a **National PURSUE intensification Campaign** run throughout November 2023 targeting money mules and mule herders.

Emma 9 focused on addressing intelligence gaps, testing data sharing using SAR glossary coding and a range of PURSUE activity. LFOR worked with the NECC and EUROPL to coordinate the UK policing response by the 9 ROCUs.



### **Outcome 4:** Raise Awareness and Prevent Crime.

NLF Role: We raise awareness of the threat and prevent fraud impacting people and businesses.

#### **Success Measures:**

- A. To increase the number of Social Media posts.
- B. To increase the reach of Social Media posts (impressions).

Across the various teams engaging on social media, the number of posts fell by 11% to 375 which is above the 22/23 quarterly average of 297. The number of related impressions rose by 13% to 2,393,304 showing positive engagement. It is believed the drop in quarterly impressions is due to Facebook performing a platform 'cleanse', removing many Bot accounts. Action Fraud has expanded its platforms, with 5.7k followers on Instagram, and is active and verified on Threads.


During the quarter, the Media Team oversaw 10 press releases and 3 interviews, a slight increase to the previous quarter. The media included a section on BBC One's Caught Red Handed and interviews in The Sun and Modern Insurance Magazine.


Press releases received coverage in local, national and trade media and included raising awareness of a range of frauds such as fraudulent travel insurance claims, ghost broking remote access scams, romance fraud and whiskey investments. A number of high-profile sentences and operations were also publicised.

The **Cyber Protect Team** worked in collaboration with colleagues at the NCSC to deliver the online shopping campaign in November 2023. The goal of the campaign was to promote behaviours that would empower individuals to shop online safely, such as how to spot phishing emails and how to make payments securely.

The campaign was supported by partners across policing, government and industry. The campaign ran throughout the festive season and reached over 15 million people and achieved over 50 million impressions.

The Cyber Protect Team is currently working toward delivering a campaign on email and social media hacking in March 2024.







NLF Role: We raise awareness of the threat and prevent fraud impacting people and businesses.

#### **Success Measures:**

C. To deliver campaigns and participate in intensification periods to raise awareness and drive prevention activity.

#### Action Fraud: 12 Frauds of Christmas

The annual '12 Frauds of Christmas' campaign, developed and delivered by Action fraud, served as a proactive initiative to raise awareness around fraud and cybercrime during the 2023 festive season. Launched at beginning of December and running until Christmas, the campaign strategically spotlighted a diverse range of fraud types, including cost of living scams, romance fraud and investment fraud.

To support the campaign, a schedule of activity, tailored messaging and assets created by the Action Fraud team were disseminated to law enforcement and industry partners. As with previous years, the campaign adopted a multi-channel approach with delivery across three major social media channels – Facebook, X (formerly Twitter), and Instagram. These platforms served as dynamic arenas for disseminating information and engaging the audience in daily fraud awareness content.

The campaign gained significant traction with the endorsement of renowned TV personality Martin Lewis. This helped to build credibility, trust and engagement with new followers. In total, the campaign achieved 61.4 million impressions with a reach of 11.7 million across digital platforms. When viewed in conjunction with the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) #CyberAware campaign focusing on online shopping, the combined estimated impressions surpassed 98 million. This collaborative approach, which involved both organisations sharing content on their digital channels, helped to amplify consistent messaging around core protect and reporting behaviours.

#### **IFED:** Commercial Insurance

Ten people were arrested across the country and 18 vehicles seized during a two-week IFED intensification to tackle commercial insurance fraud. Examples of fraud targeted included bogus claims on motor and business premises insurance, ghost brokers who sold fake motor insurance policies for vehicles used for business purposes, and fraudulent claims made by employees on their corporate benefit plans.

From 7 to 9 November, officers from IFED executed the roads-based phase in the City of London that targeted the fraudulent use of commercial motor insurance policies. An estimated total of 150 vehicles were stopped during the period. Six people were arrested on suspicion of various offences including drug-driving, taking a vehicle without consent and the possession of false identity documents with improper intention. A total of 18 vehicles that were driven without insurance were seized. In one case, a former insurance broker was charged with 39 counts of fraud by false representation and one count of money laundering.



### **Outcome 5:** Building Capacity and Capability.

**NLF Role:** As National Lead Force we work creatively and with partners to improve capacity and capability committed to fighting fraud, both across policing and the wider system.


#### **Success Measures:**


- A. To increase delegate training levels in the Economic and Cybercrime Academy.
- B. To maintain delegate satisfaction levels at 90% or above.

#### **Training Courses**

The ECCA delivered 18 training courses in Q3, an increase of 64% from Q2 (+7) but a fall of 49% (-17) from Q3 22/23. Performance was affected by the cancellation of several courses at short notice by the FCA and NCA, and it was not possible to arrange replacement training.

Delegate numbers rose from 129 in Q2 to 207 in Q3, representing an increase of 60% (+78). Delegate numbers were higher in 22/23 at 420 for the quarter, a fall of 51% (-213) year on year. This quarter, most delegates were from UK policing, with remainder from international policing or the private sector.







The Academy provided Money Laundering Courses to City of London Police officers and staff including Financial Investigators, from teams across the force, ensuring they have appropriate skills and providing career development.

A range of courses were delivered including Introduction to Economic Crime to the NECC, an interview course for the MoD and bespoke courses written for the Home Office and Foreign Office. The first set of Policing and Electoral Fraud was also delivered, along with an SFI course which received a 100% satisfaction rate.

Training and engagement took place with law enforcement in Ghana and Mauritius, enforcing working relationships. **Satisfaction** for the quarter averaged at 92%, recovering from a drop in October to score consistently above the 22/23 benchmark. The percentage of delegates completing feedback also rose as trainers are now providing time for this process within the classroom.

The Academy is monitoring the impact of training on attendees and their roles, which will inform future training when the results are analysed. The ECCA is also running a recruitment campaign, actively onboarding new Associate Trainers with specific skill sets to ensure resilience across the courses, and to build capacity and enable more training to be delivered.





### **Outcome 5:** Building Capacity and Capability.

**NLF Role:** As National Lead Force we work creatively and with partners to improve capacity and capability committed to fighting fraud, both across policing and the wider system.

### **Success Measures:**

C. To collaborate with industry and partners to develop innovative new ways to better protect victims and disrupt serious offending.

CoLP forms part of a multitude of **inter-agency groups** who tackle fraud and cybercrime in partnership. We work closely with a wide range of law enforcement and government agencies, banks and industry partners. In Q3 2023/24:

**Fraud Operations** introduced a Local Case Management Panel process with CPS Managers to discuss high risk investigations and strategies to mitigate risk and overcome significant barriers such as disclosure, digital material and matters of LPP.

**IFED** ran an effective crackdown on commercial insurance fraud supported by CoLP's Roads Policing Unit, Insurance Fraud Bureau, Motor Insurers' Bureau, the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency, Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency, HM Revenues and Customs, and insurers AXA, Allianz and Aviva.

On World Romance Scam Prevention Day, **IDT** hosted events for law enforcement and industry partners focused on sharing good practice, successful investigations and collaborative working opportunities. These were well received, with over 100 attendees in person and many further attendees via Teams.



### Spotlight on Intelligence Development Team (IDT) and Op Haechi

Op Haechi is a global counter fraud operation funded by the Korean National Police Agency (KPNA) and co-ordinated through Interpol. The aim is to create a fast global response to fraudulent international payments allowing swift repatriation of victims' money.

CoLP's Intelligence Development Team (IDT) led this year's operation on behalf of all UK law enforcement forces and agencies. CoLP's work with the National Crime Agency's (NCA) National Crime Bureau (NCB) involved helping to house urgent enquiries in host countries (32 member states).

In the four-month period from July through October 2023 IDT recovered over £2.5m of UK victim money destined for overseas bank accounts. They also influenced the initiation of two major money laundering investigations in Portugal, each with a loss to UK victims of over £1m and are working closely with the Indian authorities who have used the IDT's intelligence referrals to identify an actionable major investigation in their country.

In collaboration with the NCB over 20 high harm complicit money mules (individuals that helped to send or keep hold of illegal funds) were identified as being based in the UK. IDT generated intelligence packages for each, referring them through the Lead Force Operations Room (LFOR). LFOR then co-ordinated an effort with the regional Proactive Economic Crime Teams (PECT). These PECT teams have taken executive action against individuals and disrupted a domestic network of criminals intent on laundering the proceeds of international fraud through the UK banking system.

Officers from IDT recently returned from the Interpol Global Complex for Innovation (IGCI) conference in Singapore where they briefed international delegates on the UK's successes during Operation Haechi. Day one of the conference saw the Detective Chief Inspector represent the UK in a panel discussion for the processes used to recover victim money. On day two he delivered the statistics, operational response, and proposals for wider international collaboration in years to come.

### **Outcome 5:** Building Capacity and Capability.

**NLF Role:** As National Lead Force we work creatively and with partners to improve capacity and capability committed to fighting fraud, both across policing and the wider system.

### **Success Measures:**

D. To improve the capacity to police fraud and cybercrime by implementing additional posts and improving attraction, recruitment and retention.

#### Establishment of a new Fraud Policing Network (PURSUE):


- The 9 Regional Proactive Economic Crime Teams (PECTs) are established, and enlargement of the London response (MPS and CoLP) is being implemented with a DI and DS already in post, and 2 DCs from CoLP due to start in February. 3 DCs from the MPS will be recruited in 2024/25.
- By the end of December 2023, 151 regional posts were in place across the network, representing 92% of the target by FYE 2023/24 (168 posts) achieved. This is across both the Police/SOC Uplift Programme and HMG Spending Review investment funding.
- The growth in investigative capacity in CoLP NLF Fraud Operations has resulted in 8 new Police Staff Investigators and a PSI Supervisor in place.
- 4 CoLP leadership posts are being recruited in 2023/24. A Communications lead is in place and a DI PECT Coordinator, Performance Lead and Intelligence Lead are being recruited. Recruitment for 2024-25 FY will be initiated by a number of Regions in Q4.

### Notable operational examples include:

**ERSOU** – Live Courier Fraud investigation after an elderly lady was scammed of £570k by persons purporting to be Police Officers. A member of the criminal gang was arrested as he went to collect £316,000 of gold bullion which had been delivered to the property earlier. Enquiries are ongoing to identify further OCG members based in London.

**YHROCU** – Bank impersonation fraud. The victim transferred her savings to a bank account in the suspect's name and posted cash to an address in Glasgow. Financial work identified further victims and suspects. Suspects denied knowledge of the fraud.

**NWROCU** – Charges in respect of ticketing fraud for proceeds of crime offences. The fraud related to counterfeit tickets sales for the LFC v Real Madrid Champions League Final.



## **Appendix A - Performance Assessment Criteria**

In order to identify if these outcomes are being achieved a series of success measures for each outcome have been produced and are reported on throughout the period. The success measures related to each outcome can be found at the start of each slide alongside the current assessment for the relevant measure. These have been identified based on the data available, and whether the data is increasing or decreasing within the required tolerance level.

Success Measure Performance Assessment					
-	A green upwards arrow suggests improvement in the direction of travel.				
	A green arrow pointing right is used for consistent performance at 100%.				
-	A green arrow pointing down means a decreasing trend which is positive.				
	Amber means there has been limited increases or decreases within tolerance level.				
	A red upwards arrow suggests an increasing trend that is negative.				
-	A red downward arrow suggests a decrease in performance.				
CITY LONDON POLICE					